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Abstract
Cosmopolitans often argue that the international community has a humanitarian 
responsibility to intervene militarily in order to protect vulnerable individuals from 
violent threats and to pursue the establishment of a condition of cosmopolitan justice 
based on the notion of a ‘global rule of law’. The purpose of this article is to argue 
that many of these cosmopolitan claims are incomplete and untenable on cosmopolitan 
grounds because they ignore the systemic and chronic structural factors that underwrite 
the root causes of these humanitarian threats. By way of examining cosmopolitan 
arguments for humanitarian military intervention and how systemic problems are further 
ignored in iterations of the Responsibility to Protect, this article suggests that many 
contemporary cosmopolitan arguments are guilty of focusing too narrowly on justifying 
a responsibility to respond to the symptoms of crisis versus demanding a similarly robust 
justification for a responsibility to alleviate persistent structural causes. Although this 
article recognizes that immediate principles of humanitarian intervention will, at times, 
be necessary, the article seeks to draw attention to what we are calling principles of Jus 
ante Bellum (right before war) and to stress that current cosmopolitan arguments about 
humanitarian intervention will remain insufficient without the incorporation of robust 
principles of distributive global justice that can provide secure foundations for a more 
thoroughgoing cosmopolitan condition of public right.
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Introduction
To make our argument for why principles of Jus ante Bellum are crucial to debates about 
humanitarian military intervention, the article is divided into four sections. The first sec-
tion will undertake a brief survey of two moral arguments generally employed by cosmo-
politans when justifying the use of humanitarian military intervention. This section will 
also highlight three persistently problematic questions that have remained largely unre-
solved within the cosmopolitan literature. From this, the second section explores three 
current themes within cosmopolitan debates about humanitarian intervention and how 
these themes intersect and potentially support our argument for the incorporation of prin-
ciples of Jus ante Bellum. The third section seeks to illustrate that the lack of discussion 
about incorporating principles of Jus ante Bellum in debates about humanitarian military 
intervention is not simply confined to the realm of academia; Jus ante Bellum principles 
also relate directly to current preventative shortcomings within the Responsibility to 
Protect (RtP) and other international laws concerning the use of force. By exploring the 
language and practice of the RtP, it is possible to illustrate why it remains insufficient and 
morally malnourished on cosmopolitan grounds. Lastly, the fourth section will draw out 
three key implications of our argument for cosmopolitan thought more generally and 
how these relate to the practice of humanitarian military intervention. By exploring these 
implications, it will be argued that incorporating Jus ante Bellum principles into the cos-
mopolitan debate about the use of force will add greater consistency, legitimacy and 
focus to cosmopolitan humanitarian interventions and how our understanding of ‘inter-
vention’ can better correspond to broader cosmopolitan ambitions.
Nevertheless, before moving forward, it is important to set and justify the parameters 
of this article. Primarily, although many non-cosmopolitans within Liberalism (Doyle, 
2015; Pattison, 2010; Teson, 2003) and the English School (Booth, 2007; Dunne, 2013; 
Hurrell, 2003; Linklater, 2011; Wheeler, 2005), as well as advocates of the RtP (Bellamy, 
2014; Evens, 2008), argue for humanitarian military intervention without also providing 
explicit links to Jus ante Bellum principles, a focus on cosmopolitanism has been main-
tained for the following reasons. First, as argued later, cosmopolitans often rely on strong 
deontological claims as a foundation for military intervention, which results in unique 
tensions that require more sophisticated justification for the use of violence than has been 
previously provided (Atack, 2005; Fabre, 2012; Reader, 2007). Second, cosmopolitans 
are the staunchest promoters of global justice within International Relations, yet they still 
insufficiently link their arguments for intervention to issues of distributive justice, or 
they have done so in a way that focuses on criminal justice (Archibugi, 2008; Brock, 
2009; Fine, 2007; Held, 2010; Pattison, 2008) and cosmopolitan law enforcement 
(Hayden, 2005; Kaldor, 2003; Smith, 2007). Third, as cosmopolitans ourselves, we have 
remained uncomfortable, unsure and unconvinced by these existing cosmopolitan 
accounts supporting humanitarian military intervention and its possible cosmopolitan 
expression via the RtP (Held, 2010; Ossewaarde and Heyse, 2015; Sangha, 2012). As a 
response, this article represents an alternative and more comprehensive cosmopolitan 
vision, which we suggest can better legitimate cosmopolitan interventions as well as 
justify the ultimate aim of these interventions in the face of growing criticism. Lastly, 
although we recognize that the concept of Jus ante Bellum has clear heuristic links to just 
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war theory, human security and institutional cosmopolitanism, due to limitations of 
space, a focus on cosmopolitan military intervention is maintained. The rationale is that 
engagement with these other traditions demands significant attention beyond a single 
article and that proper treatment is best suited for future research currently underway. 
That said, where germane, the article touches upon key interconnections as they relate to 
these traditions so as to highlight important implications and areas for future Jus ante 
Bellum research.
Cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention and three 
persistent questions
When surveying the cosmopolitan literature, it becomes evident that a fair majority of 
cosmopolitans advocate the use of humanitarian military intervention as a means to 
respond to mass atrocity crimes or serious human rights violations. In arguing for human-
itarian intervention, many cosmopolitans claim not only that there is a right to intervene, 
but also that those who are in a position to effectively respond have a duty to do so 
(Archibugi, 2008; Brock, 2009; Caney, 2005; Fabre, 2012; Fine, 2007; Hayden, 2005; 
Held, 2010; Kaldor, 2003; Pattison, 2008; Pogge, 1992; Sangha, 2012; Smith, 2007). 
The moral foundations underpinning this duty relate to two corresponding cosmopolitan 
principles.
First, cosmopolitans sustain a deontological commitment which suggests that all 
human beings have an intrinsic human worth and dignity that should not be violated. In 
opposition to consequentialism, human beings matter equally, and because humans have 
an equal intrinsic worth, it is not morally permissible to violate this worth. Furthermore, 
since this worth is held equally between all human beings, we have duties to come to the 
aid of other human beings so long as it does not at the same time greatly threaten our own 
ability to live lives worthy of what it means to be a human being. As all cosmopolitans 
argue, human dignity is universal in scope, so these duties apply globally to every human 
regardless of where they happen to reside and despite their cultural and political associa-
tions. Therefore, in terms of humanitarian intervention, since humans are the primary 
unit of equal moral concern, and since mass human rights violations threaten the basic 
dignity of other human beings (and/or ourselves), we have a moral duty to intervene.
Second, many cosmopolitans argue that humanitarian intervention is a justified mech-
anism to respond to large-scale injustices associated with human rights violations 
because when properly constituted, the intervention acts as a means to establish a condi-
tion of cosmopolitan public right. In this regard, many cosmopolitans often also see 
humanitarian intervention as a method of law enforcement by the international commu-
nity (Archibugi, 2008; Fine, 2007; Hayden, 2005; Held, 2010; Kaldor, 2003, 2005; 
Smith, 2007) and/or as representing the fulfilment of a Kantian duty to transition provi-
sional rights to a condition of perfect rights that are grounded in a more thoroughgoing 
condition of cosmopolitan law and constitutionalization (Roff, 2013). As Catherine Lu 
(2006: 135–136) summarizes, when a state:
fails to provide basic goods such as security, subsistence and justice within their borders, and 
when the domestic accountability systems are inadequate or incompetent, a cosmopolitan view 
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of global order obligates the society of states, as well as the larger global civil society, to call 
sovereign power to account, and to intervene to alleviate the human suffering caused by the 
neglect, breakdown or abuse of sovereign power.
In this respect, intervention is seen as a juristic mechanism, which is grounded on deon-
tological notions of human worth, and which can bring unstable political and legal orders 
in line with cosmopolitan political aspirations and values.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that a fair majority of cosmopolitans support the use of 
humanitarian intervention as a means to address gross injustices and the violation of 
human rights, there has been a relatively limited attempt to respond to the more problem-
atic questions regarding the use of force often associated with intervention and the under-
lying cosmopolitan principles that justify its use. As Cecile Fabre (2012: 3–4) has 
recently pointed out in her more developed account of Cosmopolitan War, most cosmo-
politan theorists ‘overlook the serious normative difficulties raised by military interven-
tions which necessitate acts of killing’ and, as a result, ‘cosmopolitans … would do well 
to start thinking more deeply than they have done so far about war’.
The failure to address these questions sufficiently renders cosmopolitanism an under-
developed theory of global cohabitation, which either cannot respond to the complexities 
of humanitarian military intervention or is unwilling to ‘own up’ to these unresolved 
tensions. In simple terms, the problems are obvious but remain unsettled, and the ten-
sions stem from the fact that many cosmopolitans strongly advocate humanitarian mili-
tary intervention and ‘cosmopolitan law enforcement’ as a means to save distant strangers, 
yet, at the same time, fail to provide thoroughgoing extrapolation for exactly why there 
are clear duties to intervene and why these duties can be consistent with the underwriting 
deontological principles of cosmopolitanism. In thinking about this, it is possible to find 
at least three questions that require a more thoroughgoing response by cosmopolitans 
who advocate a duty to intervene militarily on humanitarian grounds.
The first question relates to the nature of deontological arguments themselves and an 
inherent tension that becomes manifest when innocent life is destroyed as a result of 
military operations. The tension develops because in modern warfare, it is highly fore-
seeable, as well as nearly assured, that innocent people will die as a result of military 
intervention. Whereas strict utilitarian accounts can better justify any ‘collateral damage’ 
on the basis of meeting the terms of the ‘proportionality’ calculation and by fulfilling the 
requirements of ‘double effect’, any cosmopolitan deontological approach that strictly 
posits an intrinsic right over the consequential good will undoubtedly face the dilemma 
of demanding categorical duties to protect the dignity and rights of those beyond our 
borders while, at the same time, having to justify why those rights can be suspended in 
some cases. The problem being that if the deontological position suggests that ‘the right’ 
of human dignity should trump ‘the good’, then how can this right be suspended for the 
protection of the greater good? This is not to say that cosmopolitanism cannot reconcile 
this tension, but it is important to point out that cosmopolitan efforts to do so have so far 
been minimal and, in our opinion, incomplete.1
The second question relates directly to the preceding one, namely, if cosmopolitans 
argue for the deontological worth of human beings, and if military intervention will 
inevitably kill human beings (both innocent and belligerent), then can the cosmopolitan 
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position only be consistent when adopting a pacifist position where any foreseeable 
destruction of human life remains absolutely impermissible? In this case, like the preced-
ing one, the cosmopolitan has to defend why their position promotes peace and the deon-
tological worth of human beings while, at the same time, advocating war and the known 
destruction of life as a means to bring about a cosmopolitan condition of peace (Reader, 
2007). Although these questions lie at the heart of just war theory and are the focus of 
many debates within the literature on just war, cosmopolitans themselves have largely 
forgone any direct dealing with this difficult question.2
The third question faced by cosmopolitanism, which is the question we are focusing 
on in this article, relates to cosmopolitanism’s tight relationship to arguments for dis-
tributive global justice and how this body of work should link to cosmopolitan arguments 
for humanitarian military intervention. Specifically, when surveying the literature, it is 
unclear whether humanitarian military intervention simply represents a form of immedi-
ate criminal justice or whether the idea of ‘intervention’ is also to be fully incorporated 
into broader debates about distributive justice. Although Caney (2005: 225) does suggest 
that ‘an adequate normative account of global distributive justice cannot be divorced 
from an empirical account of war’, he discusses this only in a footnote, and it is unclear 
whether he believes that the reverse relationship also holds: that an adequate normative 
account of war cannot be divorced from an empirical account of distributive global jus-
tice and what we are suggesting are corresponding duties of Jus ante Bellum. This 
absence is indicative of the cosmopolitan literature more broadly, since discussions about 
cosmopolitan humanitarian military intervention have focused on the questions of ‘when, 
who and how’ (Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Jus post Bellum) without much reflection 
on the structural reasons ‘why’ the conditions for intervention persist in the first place 
(Jus ante Bellum).
When structural reasons are considered, they are usually discussed in relation to 
institutional debates about global authority mechanisms beyond the state and the neces-
sary conditions for effective enforcement (Archibugi, 2008; Brock, 2009; Cabrera, 
2010; Fine, 2007; Hayden, 2005; Kaldor, 2003; Pogge, 1992), versus addressing broader 
socio-economic structures that perpetuate conflict and the need for intervention in the 
first place. This is not to say that institutional cosmopolitanism is not underwritten by 
concerns for distributive global justice and global reform, since many cosmopolitans 
advocate poverty alleviation (Pogge, 2001), reforms to the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) (Archibugi, 2008; Brock, 2009; Hayden, 2005) and, in more radical 
cases, a need for a world government to fulfil the demands of global justice (Cabrera, 
2010). Nevertheless, it is also fair to say that these institutional accounts have either 
assumed this connection or have not sufficiently and explicitly linked these socio-eco-
nomic concerns to long-standing advocatory positions on cosmopolitan humanitarian 
intervention.
In other words, cosmopolitans focus mainly, if not exclusively, on the symptoms and 
aftermath of conflict rather than providing any detailed discussion about the underwrit-
ing causes of structural violence and how these relate to the demands of cosmopolitan 
distributive justice. As a partial response to this particular question (leaving the first two 
questions aside), we wish to argue two main points in relation to this particular shortcom-
ing: first, that any consistent account of cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention must 
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include Jus ante Bellum principles of distributive global justice in order for it to be fully 
consistent with broader cosmopolitan aims; and, second, that this is not simply an aca-
demic mental exercise, since the failure to address underlying structural causes associ-
ated with large-scale human rights violations is a clear weakness of the RtP, which has 
left it impoverished as both a normative and practical global constitutional device.
Blurring the distinction between cosmopolitan criminal 
justice and distributive justice
There are three key intersections where what we are calling Jus ante Bellum overlaps 
with contemporary cosmopolitan discussions about humanitarian military intervention. 
However, before presenting these potential links, it is important to be clear about what 
we mean by Jus ante Bellum. As is typical in just war theory, Latin terms are often used 
to demark the various stages of war and the ‘just’ principles that must be satisfied before 
resorting to war (Jus ad Bellum — the right to war), when conducting war (Jus in Bello 
— right in war) and after the war (Jus post Bellum — right after war). In our use of Jus 
ante Bellum (right before war), we are suggesting two denotations.
The first, in line with Kant, is to understand the word right as having two correspond-
ing meanings. One that refers to having an entitlement to act in the defence of others (or 
what Fabre calls the Hohfeldian transfer of rights) and another that refers to the underly-
ing conditions of public right that must exist in order to fulfil perfect rights and/or the 
conditions of publicity necessary to move imperfect rights to perfect rights. In this last 
case, we are arguing that having the entitlement to act in defence of others must publi-
cally correspond to other conditions necessary for public right, in this case, a robust 
commitment to distributive principles that seek to eliminate gross inequalities that fore-
seeably lead to large-scale humanitarian crisis.
The second denotation relates directly to the ‘entitled’ use of force that follows from 
the first understanding just outlined. This suggests that if pro-intervention cosmopolitans 
are correct to claim that there is a strong duty to kill in order to save victims of direct 
violence, then there must also be a strong duty to prevent conflict from happening in the 
first place and that the fulfilment of this duty will require additionally robust commit-
ments to global distributive justice. The logic underpinning this suggests that if ‘helping 
under a cosmopolitan view means providing the people affected with the means to exer-
cise their own moral and social agency’ (Lu, 2006: 146), then this principle of assistance 
should surely also hold in relation to structural causes that make humanitarian military 
intervention necessary in the first place. As Newman (2009: 208) reflects, if human secu-
rity and dignity is the ultimate goal of intervention, then this ‘suggests a duty to eradicate 
the conditions that create insecurity’. In this regard, Jus ante Bellum proposes that if we 
have duties to kill in order to save distant strangers from violence, then we also have 
duties to alleviate the suffering of distant strangers from structural conditions that have a 
significant probability of leading to large-scale crisis and conflict. As a result, not only 
should cosmopolitans care about immediate crisis, but, more importantly, cosmopolitans 
also need to be more explicit about the role that humanitarian intervention plays within a 
broadened cosmopolitan vision (and vice versa) — morally, institutionally, culturally 
and within the cosmopolitanization of international law.
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One potential criticism of our focus on Jus ante Bellum is to suggest that the links 
between global structural socio-economic conditions and humanitarian crises are spuri-
ous and therefore lack the ‘relational conditions’ that any principles of cosmopolitan 
distributive justice will necessarily require (Miller, 2007: 23–50; Nagel, 2005: 114). As 
many critics of cosmopolitanism suggest, the global level does not empirically display 
the same level of ‘basic structures’ required for duties of justice to apply, and it is far 
more appropriate therefore to discuss humanitarian interventions as humanitarian assis-
tance, which requires a lower threshold of duties than justice would demand.
In response, even if we agreed that principles of global justice only apply in relational 
conditions, this view seemingly ignores an increasing body of evidence which suggests 
that conditions of economic hardship, market inequalities and global poverty signifi-
cantly increase the likelihood of conflict and mass killing. For example, Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) have shown that lower per capita income increases the likelihood of civil 
war. Similarly, Suzuki and Krause (2005) found that high levels of economic develop-
ment reduced that likelihood. Furthermore, it is known that conditions of poverty increase 
the death rates associated with humanitarian violence by as much as a factor of 50 
(Pogge, 2001). Cederman, Skrede Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) also found that eco-
nomic inequalities and market favouritism generated a high level of grievances in less 
stable political orders and, in turn, acted as one of the key motivators in mass conflict and 
civil war. Moreover, Mehta (2012) has shown not only that the way in which more devel-
oped countries purposely market and sell weapons in the developing world lacks the 
moral conscience of what we are calling Jus ante Bellum, but also that these sales signifi-
cantly increase the death count in conflict areas where these weapons are ‘reasonably 
expected’ to be used on civilians or to affect non-combatants. Finally, there is increasing 
evidence to suggest that global market inequalities, economic disadvantage and poor 
control over natural resources result in increased instability and violence on a mass scale 
(Humphreys, 2003; Ostby, 2008: 144; Sobek, 2009: 175–189; Stewart, 2009). Although 
the causal relationship between these inequitable global economic structures and 
increased conflict is still clearly an area that requires more empirical investigation, on an 
intuitive level, it would seem sensible to suggest that a causal relationship exists and that 
poor or unfavourable economic conditions positively correspond to the increased vio-
lence generally associated with what Mary Kaldor (2005) calls ‘new wars’. In addition, 
there is also now a considerable body of empirical evidence to suggest strong links 
between current global economic systems and the perpetuation of abject poverty, and 
since poverty can be seen as a key driver of organized and disorganized violence 
(Newman, 2009: 208), it would seem that there are prima facie relational global condi-
tions where Jus ante Bellum can be reasonably said to apply.
A second criticism is to suggest that what we are referring to as Jus ante Bellum is 
actually already covered within contemporary discussions regarding a justified war as 
‘an option of last resort’ under the principles of Jus ad Bellum. In this way, the argument 
is that all other methods of avoiding conflict would need to be exhausted and that the 
various distributive measures we would argue for would be part of that effort.
Nevertheless, this is not what just war theorists are actually saying, and when survey-
ing the literature, it is plain to see that the ‘option of last resort’ is directly in reference to 
an already-escalated humanitarian crisis and that the parameters for when to start 
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measuring when a response is ‘of last resort’ relates to a situation well into an existing 
cycle of violence. As a result, the demands of Jus ante Bellum are more forward-looking 
than anything seemingly involved with Jus ad Bellum since we seek to expose deeper 
structural causes. As a result of this dissimilarity, we would suggest that, prima facie, a 
categorical difference between the two exists. In addition, the distinction we are making 
for ante Bellum duties to respond to structural factors is equally wanting within current 
iterations of the RtP (Secretary-General Report, 2014) and other documents on the use of 
force. As we will outline in more detail later, responsibilities to Pillar II are still framed 
as ‘assistance’ to respond to brewing crisis points, yet say near nothing about the role of 
external states in the perpetuation of entrenched economic and political structural causes 
that have a bearing upon crisis formation. As will be discussed later, the focus of the lat-
est iteration of Pillar II requirements is still reactionary (Secretary-General Report, 
2014), still vague on commitments and aimed at dampening existing state-based ‘hot-
spots’ versus reforming exogenous factors.
Cosmopolitans themselves could make a third critique by claiming that what we are 
calling principles of Jus ante Bellum are already implicit within any cosmopolitan 
approach to humanitarian intervention. In other words, a cosmopolitan could suggest that 
a commitment to global distributive justice is a given and that the advocacy for humani-
tarian intervention should be assumed as being couched within broader schemes of cos-
mopolitan justice.
However, there are two responses that can be made here. The first is to highlight 
that the connection between humanitarian military intervention and cosmopolitan jus-
tice is too important to leave as an implied relationship and that failing to fully embed 
humanitarian intervention in broader schemes of cosmopolitan justice creates greater 
ambiguities and misperceptions of the cosmopolitan project as a whole. These misper-
ceptions can be witnessed in many of the reactions to cosmopolitanism from more 
critical voices who see cosmopolitanism as a potential form of Western cultural impe-
rialism (Cohen, 2004; Douzinas, 2007; Hobson, 2012), as a form of biopolitics masked 
as humanism (Chandler, 2009) and/or as a form of capitalist exploitation (Harvey, 
2009). As a result, if nothing else, the distinction of Jus ante Bellum seeks to try and 
make the connection between cosmopolitan justice and cosmopolitan criminal justice 
via intervention more explicit, not only for cosmopolitans themselves, but also for 
those critical of cosmopolitanism.
From this, a second response is to point out that one reason why cosmopolitans have 
failed to be explicit about the relationship between global justice and humanitarian inter-
vention is because, all too often, they unnecessarily differentiate ideal and non-ideal the-
ory as inhabiting different intellectual realms (à la Rawls). For example, the very first 
sentence of Caney’s (2005: 189) chapter on ‘Just War’ in Justice Beyond Borders claims 
that ‘thus far, this book has focused on ideal theory [Global Justice] … [now] I want to 
move from ideal theory to non-ideal theory … [because] a complete analysis must address 
what principles should apply when injustices have been committed’. The problem here is 
that this seemingly ignores the existence of a reverse relationship and, as a result, suggests 
that the structural injustices that have led to criminal injustices (crises) are not of immedi-
ate or equal importance and can be factored in separately. Furthermore, it is not exactly 
clear why responding to underlying structural drivers of injustice and the structural 
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violence associated with the causes of humanitarian intervention is the sole purview of 
ideal theory whereas exploring just war principles is somehow non-ideally more ‘real’. 
Surely they are both very ‘real’ factors involved with crisis formation and relate to the 
empirical conditions to which normative theory must necessarily respond. Our argument 
here is not that cosmopolitans have categorically ‘got it wrong’, but to highlight that cos-
mopolitans are guilty of focusing too narrowly on justifying a responsibility to respond to 
the symptoms of crisis (as a non-ideal priority) versus demanding a similarly robust justi-
fication for a responsibility to alleviate persistent structural causes (as part of a larger 
non-ideal priority). If this is true, and if cosmopolitanism is going to provide a more 
thoroughgoing normative theory for global cohabitation, then this lacuna will have to be 
addressed more rigorously than has been done thus far.
Finally, institutional cosmopolitans might make three additional critiques of the Jus 
ante Bellum position presented here. First, like earlier, it could be argued that concern for 
global institutional and structural reforms already capture the spirit of Jus ante Bellum 
and thus render it redundant. Second, world government cosmopolitans could argue that 
the cosmopolitan demand for a condition of perfect right is only obtainable under a 
strong world authority with a correspondingly robust vertical dispersal of sovereignty. 
The implication is that the fulfilment of Jus ante Bellum would also be conditioned upon 
the existence of a world government (or close approximate) to enforce this condition, 
thus making Jus ante Bellum arguments essentially reducible to a world government 
position (Cabrera, 2010) and therefore redundant. Third, and related, institutional cos-
mopolitans might suggest that even if Jus ante Bellum does not essentially collapse into 
a world government position, it nevertheless would require robust institutional reforms 
at the global level and, as a result, is not as radical a cosmopolitan alternative as pre-
sented here.
In response, it is important to recognize that the argument for Jus ante Bellum is not 
offered here as a radical departure from cosmopolitanism, but as an alternative supple-
ment to existing cosmopolitanism so as to sharpen and make the aims of the cosmopoli-
tan project more explicit as a whole. As a result, the position argued here is not, 
necessarily, antithetical to institutional cosmopolitanism or world government argu-
ments. This is because, theoretically, principles of Jus ante Bellum can remain agnostic 
in terms of institutional arrangements and can thus remain open to new institutional 
designs that go beyond existing accounts. In other words, maintaining a commitment to 
Jus ante Bellum does not commit one to world government, but only to institutional 
reforms that can meet its demands. Although this might, in the end, ultimately lead to 
something like a world government, it might not be a necessary condition, thus leaving 
scope for other pluralist accounts such as those found in global constitutionalism. 
Furthermore, by remaining institutionally agnostic, a commitment to Jus ante Bellum 
can better represent an intermediary position to advance cosmopolitan reform from exist-
ing practice, acting as a normative guide for how to think about humanitarian interven-
tion. As will be illustrated in the third section, the application of Jus ante Bellum to the 
RtP reveals key legal and structural weaknesses, which allows for crucial normative 
judgements to be delivered.
To provide a more comprehensive cosmopolitan account, we think that there are at 
least three potential links where principles of Jus ante Bellum overlap with contemporary 
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cosmopolitan discussions about humanitarian military intervention. First, under the ban-
ner of Jus ad Bellum, there is a requirement that the use of force is only justified when it 
is waged with the right intentions. Traditional justifications have usually claimed that a 
right intention can be: (1) to stop violence in order to establish a peace-keeping mission 
with the long-term aim of brokering a legitimate reformed government made up of war-
ring factions; (2) to completely remove an unjust regime for the establishment of an 
externally imposed ‘just’ regime; and/or (3) to simply save distant strangers from imme-
diate mass killing while leaving any long-term institutional solutions for debate during 
post-conflict reconstruction. Yet, underpinning this just war principle, particularly in 
relation to the justification for humanitarian military intervention, is the moral argument 
for the protection of human beings from harm. As mentioned earlier, in the case of cos-
mopolitan humanitarian military intervention, the grounding for the protection of indi-
viduals stems from their inherent moral worth and the equal dignity we owe them as 
fellow human beings. If this is the case, as all cosmopolitans suggest, then the right 
intention is not simply to stop the immediate violence (although this is certainly a prin-
ciple of first intent), but to also establish a global condition of public right. In this regard, 
it would seem that for the cosmopolitan, a condition of ‘just intention’ must take into 
account the ‘just aims’ associated with those intentions and how those aims correspond 
to deeper structural socio-economic conditions that threaten to perpetuate violence. This 
is not just in regards to cases of immediate crisis, but also in relation to regions where 
there is a high potential for future crisis. Therefore, it would seem that for the cosmopoli-
tan, having a ‘just intention’ is coupled with also having a ‘just aim’ that must necessarily 
go beyond the basic principles of Jus post Bellum as a way to incorporate cosmopolitan 
principles of distributive justice. If incorporated properly into a cosmopolitan humanitar-
ian approach, this would include such activities as altering unjust economic conditions, 
curbing arms sales to conflict regimes (Oxfam, 2007; Pogge, 2001), limiting cash trans-
fers to warring parties (Pogge, 2001), reforming unequal market conditions and trade 
relations (Nili, 2011), addressing systems of capital flight/profit shifting and strengthen-
ing poverty reduction efforts, and so on (IDRC, 2001). Although detailed here only 
briefly, the implications are considerable. Namely, ‘intention’ is always logically linked 
to ‘aim’, and any consistent cosmopolitan position therefore needs to make this link 
between their intention to save strangers and their concern for the broader conditions in 
which these strangers require saving in the first place, especially as measured against the 
bar and aims of cosmopolitan justice.
Another potential connection between Jus ante Bellum and cosmopolitan humanitarian 
intervention relates to questions regarding who is responsible to intervene. Specifically, as 
Fabre (2012: 181) has correctly pointed out in her book Cosmopolitan War:
there is another argument for the duty to intervene as grounded in considerations of reparative 
justice, whereby the IP [intervening party] is under a duty because it is in part responsible for 
the predicament in which TP’s [target parties] find themselves.
In other words, what Fabre is suggesting is that ‘whether a potential intervener is partly 
responsible for the rights violations to which the intervention is a response might be 
relevant to the assignment of the duty to intervene’ (Fabre, 2012: 189). In exploring this 
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assignment of responsibility, Fabre uses the example of Belgium’s potential role in 
advancing the structural causes that ‘encouraged and fostered a climate of ethnic division 
and hatred’ (Fabre, 2012: 189) during its colonial mandate in Rwanda and how France 
furthered calamity by supplying weapons to the massacring parties right up to, as well as 
during, the Rwanda genocide. As Fabre states: ‘in such cases it might stand to reason that 
France had a primary reason to intervene’ (Fabre 2012: 189). Furthermore, in her own 
estimation regarding when such an intervention could be deemed successful, Fabre 
(2012: 190) claims that ‘humanitarian war will not successfully fulfill its just cause if it 
merely stops human rights violations in the short term: instead, it must secure the condi-
tions under which the rights of its beneficiaries are secure in the long term’.
Nevertheless, this begs two questions. First, what if the responsibility for crisis is 
more related to structural inequalities and economic conditions built into the existing 
global order? Also, what if those structural conditions are, in some sense, understood to 
exist and to be perpetuated by certain powerful global actors? If responsibility should be 
assigned to those who protract these underlying causes, then under the existing argu-
ments of global justice, many Western countries that have benefited greatly from the 
current unequal socio-economic structures that underwrite humanitarian crises would 
therefore be responsible for alleviating the effects of a crisis. Furthermore, if responsibil-
ity is associated with those who profit most from persistent economic inequalities, then 
responsibility could arguably move beyond Western countries to incorporate the Group 
of Twenty (G20), since this group represents roughly 90% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) output and is already responsible for 94% of official development assistance. In 
this way, demands for structural reform could be led by a small number of key actors. 
Second, if Fabre is right that successful intervention is related to long-term security, and 
if underlying global socio-economic conditions can be shown to have played a signifi-
cant role in causing humanitarian crisis, then the question needs to be asked about the 
yardstick used to measure success and the key role that cosmopolitan theories of global 
justice should necessarily play in determining the long-term aims and successes of 
humanitarian intervention. In this way, what we are calling Jus ante Bellum plays two 
important normative roles: it provides a heuristic tool to help think about how to assign 
responsibility; and it helps us reflect more clearly about what conditions need to exist (or 
have existed that should not) in order to alleviate the underlying structural causes that 
help to perpetuate or escalate humanitarian violence in the first place.
Third, the idea of Jus ante Bellum has a potential connection to a number of condi-
tions under the banners of Jus ad Bellum and Jus post Bellum. Although we cannot 
develop these in more detail here, prima facie, there are immediate connections and 
implications to be drawn out in terms of determining whether or not an intervention will 
‘have a reasonable chance of success’, in relation to the ‘good outweighing the harms 
caused by military intervention’, and in relation to the interveners’ ‘responsibility to help 
reconstruct the vanquished country/countries’. In all of these cases, it would seem that 
cosmopolitans should have something meaningful to say in relation to what the demands 
of cosmopolitan justice require of these just war principles. That said, at the moment, of 
the few cosmopolitans who do engage with just war theory and humanitarian military 
intervention, the focus has largely been to justify why a cosmopolitan can endorse mili-
tary intervention (Archibugi, 2004; Fine, 2007; Held, 2010; Kaldor, 2003; Pogge, 1992; 
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Smith, 2007), to clarify in what cases an intervention is justified on cosmopolitan grounds 
(Brock, 2009; Fine, 2007; Pattison, 2008; Pogge, 1992) or to implant certain cosmopoli-
tan values into existing just war clauses (Caney, 2005; Fabre, 2012; Hayden, 2005). 
What is underdeveloped is a revamped approach to cosmopolitan humanitarian interven-
tion that fully integrates it within broader cosmopolitan concerns for global distributive 
justice. Otherwise, without this more thoroughgoing account, it is our belief that cosmo-
politanism will remain largely an ‘add-on’ to the current debates without doing much to 
alter existing structures of unequal global constitutionalization, crisis prevention or the 
human suffering that is supposedly at the heart of why we have moral duties to intervene 
in the first place. Furthermore, a concern for what we are calling Jus ante Bellum is not 
purely an academic exercise because it is germane to contemporary international legal 
debates as they pertain to the use of force, and therefore has implications for how we 
think about the responsibility to protect distant strangers and what the demands of ‘pre-
vention, reaction and rebuilding’ within the RtP should mean for cosmopolitans. It is to 
examining the RtP from this cosmopolitan perspective that we now turn our attention.
The RtP as a response to symptoms not causes
So far, the argument has been that cosmopolitans have been focused too narrowly on the 
symptoms of crises without fully integrating cosmopolitan principles of distributive jus-
tice that could help mitigate the underlying causes that perpetuate humanitarian crisis in 
the first place. Nonetheless, as suggested in the previous section, this concern for Jus 
ante Bellum is also relevant to the ways in which we think about contemporary interna-
tional law, as well as the persistent debates attached to the international society’s respon-
sibility to protect distant strangers. Furthermore, there have been recent attempts by 
cosmopolitans to argue that the RtP embodies a cosmopolitan approach to intervention 
(Sangha, 2012) and that the RtP symbolizes a ‘cosmopolitan stepping stone’ within inter-
national law (Held, 2010; Ossewaarde and Heyse, 2015). Consequently, the aim of this 
section is to illustrate that the tensions that we suggest are engrained within the cosmo-
politan treatment of humanitarian military intervention are also present in many aspects 
of the RtP.
The RtP: Moving on from humanitarian intervention?
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
produced its report on the idea of a ‘responsibility to protect’. Noting the increasing trend 
in international law towards protection of the individual, the RtP has sought to re- 
conceptualize the notion of sovereignty away from the traditional legal view of territorial 
control and towards a human rights-centred view of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ 
(ICISS, 2001: 12, para. 2.8). The state retains primary sovereign responsibility for its 
citizens, but if the:
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state 
failure, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. (ICISS: xi)
Brown and Bohm 909
In 2005, at the United Nations World Summit, the RtP was discussed widely and received 
a positive, if cautious, reception. This has been described by Nicolas Wheeler (2005: 97) 
as ‘190 states committed themselves to the principle that the rule of non-intervention was 
not sacrosanct’ in cases such as genocide. The RtP has not changed international law on 
the use of force, and the World Summit discussions stressed the need for states to under-
take their responsibility to protect in line with international law, but it does represent 
affirmation of the UNSC’s view of certain human rights abuses as threats to international 
peace and security. Again, the latest iteration of the RtP in 2014 re-enumerates these 
commitments and, as will be discussed later, further seeks to outline ‘ways in which 
national, regional and international actors can assist States in fulfilling their responsibil-
ity to protect populations’ (Secretary-General Report, 2014: 2, para. 1). Thus, the UNSC 
and the ‘international community’ can be said to be increasingly accepting of humanitar-
ian concerns as justification for military intervention, and accept military intervention as 
an appropriate response to humanitarian concerns. The RtP was invoked by the UNSC in 
its discussions on Libya, the Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, to name but a few situations, and 
also by the Human Rights Council. As such, it has been argued that the RtP is a coherent 
and useful ‘stepping stone’ in our responsibility towards vulnerable individuals and that 
it is gaining increasing legitimacy within international society (Ossewaarde and Heyse, 
2015; Sangha, 2012).
The RtP has attempted to be more than just a doctrine on humanitarian intervention 
and providing military help to solve human rights abuses. It is intended to provide a more 
complete account of our responsibility towards vulnerable individuals, with a wider 
focus than simply Jus ad Bellum questions of whether/when to undertake humanitarian 
military intervention, including the prevention of crises and post-conflict rebuilding. For 
example, the ICISS (2001: 20, para. 3.9) report commented that conflict prevention was 
key, highlighting the importance of early warning of conflict hot spots. The ICISS (2001: 
19, para. 3.2) report also noted the responsibility of the international community to fulfil 
its secondary responsibility towards vulnerable populations using economic, political 
and legal, as well as military, means. In addition, the latest report of the Secretary-
General in 2014 outlines Pillar II pledges stipulating that the international community 
will ‘support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability, and assist 
those which are under stress before crisis and conflicts break out’ (Secretary-General 
Report, 2014: 2, para. 1).
This wider approach to human rights abuse prevention is still based on the assump-
tions of Fabre and others: ‘a political regime has a claim to govern over a given territory 
only if it respects and protects the fundamental rights of its individual members’, if it 
fails to do so, then ‘a cosmopolitan ethics of assistance yield a duty to provide military 
help to those in need’ (Fabre, 2012: 170, 207). Despite arguments that the RtP is funda-
mentally different from the previous concept of humanitarian intervention, it will be 
shown that the RtP suffers from the same misconceptions about duties towards distant 
strangers that have consistently haunted the humanitarian intervention debate. The key 
problem with the RtP’s understanding of global injustice, explained in more detail in the 
next section, is that it is insufficiently cosmopolitan because the RtP locates the blame 
for crises with the government of the state that is perceived to be unable or unwilling to 
protect its population, providing for the ‘international community’ of willing states to 
exercise a secondary cosmopolitan responsibility towards distant strangers. In addition, 
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the Pillar II commitments of the RtP as outlined in 2014 continue to posit a language of 
‘assistance’ versus ‘duties’ to reform unjust exogenous structural causes. In constructing 
the problem and the solution in this way, the RtP perpetuates the same mistakes of the 
humanitarian intervention debate, overlooking the international community’s involve-
ment in the intrinsic injustices operating at the systemic level, which themselves contrib-
ute to the outbreaks of violence to which the RtP seeks to respond.
The RtP: New doctrine, same mistakes
The ICISS (2001: 19, para. 3.2) report expresses the view that a ‘firm national commitment 
to ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities for all citizens provides a solid basis for 
conflict prevention’. If this national commitment is not forthcoming, there is a role for the 
international community in identifying local conflict triggers (ICISS, 2001: 19, para. 3.4) 
and putting pressure on the national government to institute fair national structures of good 
governance, whether bilaterally or through international financial institutions (ICISS, 
2001: 27, para. 3.41). These base commitments were reiterated in 2014: the international 
community should provide ‘encouragement, capacity-building and protection assistance, 
and good examples of good national, regional and international practice’ (Secretary-
General Report, 2014: 1). If these preventative efforts fail, then the international commu-
nity still has a further responsibility — that of reaction rather than prevention. This reaction 
does not have to be military in nature, moving away from humanitarian intervention’s 
focus on the use of force and including political, legal and economic measures such as 
sanctions or diplomacy (ICISS, 2001: 29, para. 4.5). The international community also has 
a responsibility to rebuild society if destructive force is used, with an emphasis on ‘local 
ownership’ of this process, together with a national commitment to fair treatment and good 
governance that was held to be key at the prevention stage (ICISS, 2001: 39, para. 5.2; 
Secretary-General Report, 2014: 11, paras 41–42). ICISS focuses on national structures 
and responsibilities, in particular, within the pillars of prevention (Pillar II) and reaction 
(Pillar III) (understandably, since the responsibility to react must necessarily be from the 
international community if the national level has failed in its responsibility). It is within 
these pillars that the state as provider of domestic justice is most evident — justice in the 
RtP being equated with good governance, itself understood in terms of democratic repre-
sentation, fair treatment and fair opportunities for individuals.
It can thus be seen that the RtP’s focus is on national commitments by a government 
towards its citizens, with the international responsibility focused on curing defects at the 
national level and building a good society through, for example, international financial 
institutions’ good governance efforts or through post-conflict rebuilding. This view of 
the causes of injustice and the way to achieve justice suffers from several shortcomings, 
which are also mirrored in the cosmopolitan approach to humanitarian military interven-
tion, as discussed in the second section. As we have argued, considerations of Jus ante 
Bellum are not only a necessary component to any cosmopolitan approach to humanitar-
ian intervention, but also an important factor to take seriously in current debates sur-
rounding the RtP.
One immediate problem with the RtP’s approach to humanitarian crises is that it 
views the state as the only appropriate entity that can deliver social justice, as well as the 
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only source responsible for the underlying problems associated with humanitarian crisis. 
Although the strengthening capacities of the private sector and development aid strate-
gies are briefly mentioned in the latest iteration of Pillar II commitments as means to 
assist crisis states, they are framed as ‘assistance’ mechanisms and not as potential causal 
factors that require immediate reform as a demand of justice. As a result, the ‘real’ causes 
of threats to individuals are perceived as stemming near exclusively from the local level. 
This presentation of the causes of threats and their potential solutions fails to accept the 
possibility that the international community has contributed to the conditions of injustice 
from which it then wishes to rescue people. These conditions of injustice for which the 
international community is arguably responsible include both immediate contributions to 
civil and political strife in problem states and more general, systemic problems of socio-
economic poverty and inequality. In the second section of this article, we suggested a 
potentially significant link between socio-economic inequality and outbreaks of violence 
in which atrocities occur. It is therefore problematic that the RtP does not fully take 
account of this link in its supposedly new Pillar II approach to the idea of humanitarian 
military intervention.
Hilary Charlesworth (2002), mirroring many of our concerns, views the focus on 
crises (and their consequent need for urgent military action in response) as also being 
problematic in contemporary legal debates. She comments that ‘using crises as the focus 
means that the “fundamental” questions and enquiries are very restricted’ and argues that 
this focus ‘diverts attention from structural issues of global justice’ (Charlesworth, 2002: 
377, 382). We have already argued, in the second section, that these structural issues 
(such as global poverty and health inequality) are important not only in their own right 
as issues of justice with which cosmopolitans should be concerned, but also because such 
structural problems are closely related to outbreaks of violence. By framing the key 
problem facing the international community as four particular acts of mass atrocity, the 
RtP perpetuates this crisis focus and neglects the importance of socio-economic issues 
and their significant relationship with the violence to which the RtP itself seeks to 
respond. A well-used example can be taken from some 1998 statistics. In this year, there 
were 588,000 deaths resulting from war and 736,000 resulting from social violence; dur-
ing the same period, starvation claimed the lives of 18 million people, 34 million people 
worldwide were suffering from AIDS and HIV, and 1.2 billion people were suffering 
from malnourishment (Hurrell, 2003: 42). Even if particular conflicts can be shown to 
result in higher death tolls than the violence in 1998 (e.g. 800,000 died in Rwanda and 
over 200,000 are thought to have died in Syria), these statistics still give pause for 
thought. The disparity between concern for civil and political deaths and socio-economic 
deaths is troubling in its own right, purely ‘on the numbers’. However, it is also troubling 
from the perspective of the consistency of the cosmopolitan argument in favour of help-
ing strangers.
Related to this crisis focus, a second problem with the RtP is that it poses the ques-
tion of intervention — or any response under the ‘reaction’ pillar (Pillar III) — as sim-
ply one of ‘doing something or doing nothing’ (Chesterman, 2000: 108) — of being in 
favour of humanitarian military intervention or of adhering to a wholly unacceptable 
ethical theory that allows wholesale slaughter (Teson, 2003: 93). As Glennon (1999: 5) 
says: ‘[a] child saved from ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by NATO’s [North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organization’s] intervention is no less alive because the intervention was 
impromptu rather than part of a formal [legal] system’. Yet, this debate poses the issue 
of humanitarian intervention in terms of the opposition between the rules of interna-
tional law on non-intervention and non-use of force3 versus the failure of some govern-
ments to obey international human rights norms towards their own citizens (Teson, 
2003; Weiss, 2007: 12). Although the RtP was intended to move on from the humanitar-
ian intervention debate (e.g. by focusing on victims rather than interveners), debates 
surrounding RtP continue to return to the idea that a crisis has arisen, through national 
failure or fault, and the international community — a neutral entity or a force for good 
— has the option of acting successfully to deal with the problem. Again as suggested in 
the second section, the international community is, in fact, already deeply involved in 
non-military interventions in many problem states, through complex economic and 
political relationships (whether transnational corporations or international institutions). 
This calls into question the ‘neutral’ starting point of doing something or doing nothing 
in response to a crisis — the international community is already ‘doing something’ in 
many states in which problems develop (Alston, 1992: 107; Bellamy, 2003: 329; 2009: 
99, 131). It thus seems that the debate has not moved forward as much as RtP supporters 
hope. Thus, despite the RtP’s attempt at providing a broader, more nuanced response to 
the issues raised by mass atrocities in the 2014 report of the Secretary-General, the issue 
nevertheless returns consistently to the issue of international military intervention as a 
reaction to national failures, with little consideration of how the international commu-
nity is itself morally and legally implicated in promoting various causal factors that help 
lead to injustice and violence.
Drawing upon this binary representation of the possible responses to crises by the 
international community, a third problem with RtP relates to how the question of justice 
is framed and its focus on a society of ‘good’ states and the manifest failure of a particu-
lar state. While intending to move past the human rights–non-intervention deadlock of 
humanitarian intervention, the RtP falls prey to this same deadlock and division between 
good and bad states through its location of blame for the main problems faced by vulner-
able populations (civil wars, repression and state collapse). This blame is located at the 
national level, from a national governmental failure to ensure fair treatment (Gordenker 
and Weiss, 1993; Reisman, 1991; Teson, 1995, 1996). The RtP perceives the interna-
tional community’s preventative role as being in ‘assisting’ to identify local triggers of 
conflict (and responding to these triggers with political, legal, economic and military 
measures) rather than in changing global structures that perpetuate potential conflicts 
(ICISS, 2001: 19, paras 3.3, 3.4).
In addition to the general points made by Alston, Bellamy and others, we use a more 
specific example to demonstrate our point. The crisis that developed in the Balkans in the 
early 1990s was suggested to be the result of long-brewing ethnic hatreds and tensions 
— local problems of local people. Compared to this local cause of problems, it was natu-
ral to view the international ‘level’ of actors as being able to come to the rescue — rather 
than viewing international actors as potentially part of the local causes (Orford, 1997: 
444). Nevertheless, examining this local–international division more closely, Anne 
Orford (1997: 453) and Susan Woodward (1995: 3) both find a chain of causation leading 
from the international community’s activities to the local instability and devastation that 
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took place in the region. The different Yugoslavian provinces had coexisted fairly peace-
fully and autonomously from the central government and from each other, with limited 
calls for independence and secession. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) then attached stringent conditions to Yugoslavia’s repayment of its Cold War 
debts. These included changes to the constitution that increased centralized control and 
reduced the independence of the country’s autonomous regions. As well as this general 
decrease in self-determination at the province level, the specific changes introduced by 
this newly powerful central government (at the behest of the international institutions) 
included reduced state education availability and reduced labour laws relating to worker 
protection. Changes such as these resulted in increased overall poverty and unemploy-
ment, and increased insecurity and social exclusion — together with calls for independ-
ence of various regions so that these locales could then reverse the damage done by the 
social changes forced upon the country by the central government and international 
actors (Orford, 1997: 454). Similar points can be made in relation to the international–
local relationships in Rwanda — both Belgium’s colonial policies and, later, neoliberal 
economic policies enacted in Rwanda’s coffee sector. These helped to create conditions 
of structural tension that played a role in the genocide (Bohm, 2013: 247; Jones, 1995; 
Mamdani, 2001: 13; Robbins, 2002).
What this point highlights, in connection to our previous argument, is that it is 
highly conceivable that the international system is involved in perpetuating causes of 
conflict. Although good development aid practices and private sector compliance with 
the 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are cited 
as ways to reduce ‘risk’ within Pillar II refinements (Secretary-General Report, 2014: 
7, para. 26), these continue to be under-defined in terms of duties of justice, and as the 
UN itself admits, ‘there is still too little will to operationalize prevention’ (Secretary-
General Report, 2014: 18, para. 73). Of course, the Balkan crisis pre-dates ICISS and 
the RtP, but the same problems can be seen in the RtP era: the RtP locates the problem 
of mass atrocities, and its causes, firmly at the local level — and correspondingly 
places the solution to this problem in the hands of ‘enlightened’ states in the interna-
tional community (Glennon, 1999: 3). For example, despite Orford’s suggestion that 
the interference of the ‘international community’ — particularly in the form of the 
World Bank and IMF — was a significant contributing factor to the violence in the 
Balkans, the RtP views these institutions as part of the international community’s sec-
ondary responsibility to protect people by encouraging good governance and human 
rights. This more nuanced account of the causes of local problems challenges the uni-
directional focus of both the RtP and supporters of humanitarian military intervention 
such as Fernando Teson (2003) — this unidirectional focus being evident in the idea 
that the universal nature of human rights obligations requires us to rescue those in 
danger of atrocities. Surely such universal obligations should be engaged before the 
idea of ‘rescue’ ever becomes necessary — in a universal obligation not to contribute 
to the injustices and crises from which we then wish to rescue people. Of course, those 
individuals actually carrying out acts of genocide or ethnic cleansing are not blameless 
— but the government of the problem state, and the individuals within the state in 
question, are not the only cause of harm. Although Weiss (2007) argues that in the 
ICISS consultations, nobody asked for less intervention, they often wanted more, this 
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argument (that intervention is what the victims want) does not respond adequately to 
the question of why military intervention is ‘required’ in the first place.
That said, one paragraph of the RtP does give some acknowledgement to the elements 
associated with what we are labelling Jus ante Bellum by outlining some ‘root’ causes of 
conflict — those of ‘poverty, political repression, and uneven distribution of resources’ 
(ICISS, 2001: 22, para. 3.19). This is also mirrored in the Report on State Responsibility 
and Prevention (United Nations, 2013: 1), where armed conflict flows from ‘persistent 
patterns of discriminations; economic deprivation and related disparities; weakness in 
state structures; motives or incentives to commit atrocity crimes, including the presence 
of crimes’. ICISS also criticizes the level of Cold War debts and the trade policies of 
richer countries, both of which prevent poor countries from dealing with poverty and 
underdevelopment (ICISS, 2001: 20, para. 3.8). However, despite this acknowledge-
ment, the question of the potential responsibility of the international community for this 
poverty (and therefore the associated violence escalation (Galtung, 1996)) is sidestepped. 
This is because the RtP posits that root causes, such as poverty, can be resolved by demo-
cratic participation and the strengthening of human rights at the national level (ICISS, 
2001: 19, para. 3.2). This means that the RtP avoids considering the extent of the inter-
national community’s duty towards non-citizens in relation to poverty and inequality in 
a thoroughgoing manner — it is not at all clear what responsibility external states have 
towards rectifying their role in perpetuating these root causes and ICISS devotes a mere 
six lines (from 108 pages) to the issue of how schemes of distributive justice could help 
produce international order (ICISS, 2001: 23, para. 3.22). Economic development is seen 
more as part of Jus post Bellum, in the international community’s duty to rebuild and 
encourage growth, than any concept of Jus ante Bellum. In other words, like most cos-
mopolitans writing on intervention, the RtP does not sufficiently address the global struc-
tural causes that have played a significant part in creating the conditions associated with 
conflict escalation. As has been noted by scholars of the RtP, ‘the preventive dimension 
… has been consistently side-lined’ (Sharma, 2010: 127) and was seemingly only ‘tagged 
on in order to make military intervention more palatable’ (Bellamy, 2011: 19).
Most principles of justice are deemed to end at state boundaries — the state must 
treat its people justly, through equality of political rights and opportunities (Rawls, 
1971). Other states are not required to treat other individuals — non-citizens — justly, 
by increasing duties to non-citizens in the socio-economic realm. As most just war prin-
ciples of social justice end at state borders (and are, in any event, focused more on civil 
and political than socio-economic rights), international legal regimes governing fair 
access to food or drugs are not seen as a problem relating to international order with 
which the international community should concern itself. A wider emphasis on socio-
economic rights (and a wider emphasis on responsibility beyond the national, domestic 
level of a government and its citizens) as part of ideas of duties of justice would con-
sider international responsibility to individuals across the globe — both for global 
socio-economic inequalities and specific outbreaks of violence. By neglecting this 
important issue, the RtP has not, in fact, ‘moved on’ from the humanitarian intervention 
debate (and the problems that dog the cosmopolitan argument in favour of humanitarian 
military intervention) in any significant way.
As a result, this raises important questions about ethical theory and its relationship to 
international law, and why it is possible to prohibit the abuse of certain civil and political 
Brown and Bohm 915
rights by a government but not prohibit the abuse of socio-economic rights affected by 
global structures. It seems inconsistent for a theory of ethics (which underpins the RtP and 
attempts to move international law ‘forward’ in human protection) to prohibit certain forms 
of intra-state violence but fail to prohibit prior interference from other states or institutions 
that can lead to instability, poverty and the prohibited acts of violence themselves.
To respond, we argue that both cosmopolitans and advocates of RtP should rethink the 
role of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ away from placing blame for crises only with the 
government of the state in which the crisis occurs. This is because if cosmopolitans are 
truly concerned with protecting individuals from harm, and the harms directly related to 
military crisis, then fulfilling these aims actually requires a more nuanced approach to 
the relationship between mass atrocities and global poverty and inequality. If this is to be 
done thoroughly, then we believe that this will necessarily require a better connection to 
be made between cosmopolitan justice and current arguments for intervention, as posed 
by the RtP.
Conclusion: Jus ante Bellum and the demands of the 
consistent argument within cosmopolitanism and its 
approach to humanitarian military intervention
In this article, we have argued that many cosmopolitan claims about humanitarian mili-
tary intervention are incomplete on cosmopolitan grounds because they ignore the sys-
temic and chronic structural factors that underwrite the root causes of these humanitarian 
threats. By way of examining cosmopolitan arguments for humanitarian military inter-
vention and how systemic problems are further ignored in international legal tenets such 
as the RtP, we have suggested that many contemporary cosmopolitans are guilty of 
focusing too narrowly on justifying a responsibility to respond to the symptoms of crisis 
versus demanding a similarly robust justification for a responsibility to alleviate persis-
tent structural causes. Although we fully recognize that immediate principles of humani-
tarian intervention will, at times, be necessary, the purpose of this article has been to 
draw attention to what we are calling principles of Jus ante Bellum (right before war) and 
to stress that current cosmopolitan arguments about humanitarian intervention will 
remain insufficient without the incorporation of robust principles of distributive global 
justice that can provide secure foundations for a more thoroughgoing cosmopolitan con-
dition of public right. In making a stronger link between a cosmopolitan approach to 
humanitarian intervention and cosmopolitan principles of global distributive justice, 
three positive implications are generated.
First, fully embedding arguments for humanitarian interventions and the demands 
thereof into robust principles of cosmopolitan justice will help sharpen the aims of inter-
vention, as well as generating a better philosophical response to those who view cosmo-
politanism as a form of imperialism. As argued earlier, linking intervention to an idea of 
Jus ante Bellum will help to clarify the motivating aims behind ‘just intent’ under the 
banner of Jus ad Bellum, as well as solidifying the chances of greater success for the 
intervention itself.
Second, fully embedding arguments for humanitarian interventions and the demands 
thereof into robust principles of cosmopolitan justice will help to create a greater sense 
of legitimate authority for the interveners. This is because, if taken seriously, principles 
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of Jus ante Bellum would have already required considerable efforts by the international 
community to correct structural elements that were greatly affecting stability. Again, if 
done properly and with a mutually consistent sense of global justice, the position of 
legitimacy held by the international community (or those intervening) would be height-
ened. This supports not only the legitimate authority clause of Jus ad Bellum, but also the 
idea of a legitimate ‘international society’, which can only assist in making any neces-
sary intervention less bloody and more widely accepted because of its grounding in a 
more thoroughgoing notion of ‘justice’.
Third, we suggest that there is a strong element of consistency attached to the princi-
ple of Jus ante Bellum. Namely, it seems completely incoherent to claim that states owe 
a universal duty of justice and protection of human rights to their citizens while also 
claiming that there are no universal duties to people beyond borders until violence erupts. 
What is unclear in this case is why physical violence demands a corrective duty, yet other 
forms of known structural violence do not. Furthermore, intuitively, it seems incoherent 
to claim that there is a duty to kill in order to save distant strangers, but not a duty to alter 
unjust structural conditions that will foster that need to kill in the first place. In this 
regard, fully embedding arguments for humanitarian intervention and the demands 
thereof into robust principles of cosmopolitan justice can only help to create a more con-
sistent argument by cosmopolitans. If this makes sense, then any policy such as the RtP, 
which seeks to protect vulnerable individuals from harm, requires a change of priorities 
away from a focus on military interventions into crisis situations, and towards redressing 
structural, systemic causes of crises before they occur. In a modern context, this will, of 
course, include health, employment opportunities and education. Importantly, it will also 
include the seemingly obvious, but so far avoided, restriction upon arms sales and uneth-
ical corporate activities in unstable regions, together with a commitment to non-military, 
consensual diplomatic peace processes.
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Notes
1. Both Cecile Fabre (2012) and Simon Caney (2005) have attempted to reconcile this tension. 
In both cases, the argument is made that a middle position between deontological and utilitar-
ian accounts can be found via what they call a ‘rights-centred’ approach. Stronger links to Jus 
ante Bellum strengthen this middle position and better articulate the aims of cosmopolitan 
intervention.
2. Fabre (2012: 13–14) has also given some attention to this problem, conceding that there is an 
inherent deontological tension in cosmopolitanism as it relates to the use of force, but that for 
practical purposes, cosmopolitanism can be adapted, and that cosmopolitans should not resist 
the urge to protect global goods to which we all have claims as human beings. As a result, where 
there are clear threatening cases, military intervention is justified. In our opinion, stronger links 
to Jus ante Bellum strengthen this cosmopolitan appeal to ‘global goods’ and thus supplement 
and support a more comprehensive cosmopolitan account, as advocated by Fabre.
3. Art 2(7) and 2(4), UN Charter.
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